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Abstract
Unlike most development  initiatives, conditional  cash  Brazil, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
transfer programs recently introduced in the Latin  Evaluation  results from the first generation  of programs
America and the Caribbean region have been subject to  in Brazil,  Mexico, and Nicaragua show that conditional
rigorous evaluations of their effectiveness.  These  cash transfer programs are  effective  in promoting human
programs provide money to poor families,  conditional  capital accumulation among poor households. There is
on certain  behavior,  usually investments  in human  clear evidence  of success in increasing  enrollment rates,
capital-such as sending children to school or bringing  improving preventive  health care, and raising household
them to  health centers  on a regular basis. Rawlings  and  consumption.  Despite this promising  evidence, many
Rubio review the experience  in evaluating  the impact of  questions  remain  unanswered about the impact of
these programs, exploring  the application  of  conditional  cash transfer programs,  including  those
experimental  and quasi-experimental  evaluation methods  concerning their effectiveness under different country
and summarizing results from programs launched  in  conditions and the sustainability of the welfare  impacts.
This paper-a product of the Human Development Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is part of a larger
effort in the region to assess the effectiveness  of social protection programs. Copies of the paper are available  free from the
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Maria Colchao, room 17-162, telephone 202-473 -
8048, fax 202-522-1202, email address mcolchao@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the
Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  Irawlings@worldbank.org  or
gm_rubio@alumni.princeton.edu.  August  2003.  (25 pages)
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Conditional  cash  transfers  (CCT)  are  part of a new generation  of development  programs
that seek to  foster human  capital  accumulation  among the  young  as  a means to breaking
the inter-generational  cycle of poverty.  As their name  implies,  conditional  cash  transfers
provide  money  to poor  families  conditional  upon  investments  in  human  capital  such  as
sending  children  to  school  or bringing  them  to  health  centers  on  a  regular  basis.  This
reliance  on  market  principals,  using  demand-side  interventions  to  directly  support
beneficiaries  is  a  marked  departure  from  traditional  supply-side  mechanisms  such  as
general  subsidies  or investments  in schools,  health centers  and  other  providers  of social
services.
Conditional  cash  transfer  (CCT)  programs  aimed  at  improving  children's  human  capital
have been established  in numerous countries  in recent years, particularly in Latin America
and the  Caribbean.  Mexico  launched  the Programa  de Educaci6n, Salud y Alimentaci6n
(PROGRESA') in  1997,  the  first  large  scale  CCT program  in  the region.  Brazil  has  the
Programa  Nacional de Bolsa Escola and Programa  de Erradica,ao  do Trabalho Infantil,
(PETI),  Colombia  the  Familias en  Accion  program  (FA),  Honduras  the  Programa de
Asignacion Familiar  (PRAF),  Jamaica  the Program of Advancement  through  Health  and
Education (PATH), and Nicaragua the Red de Protecci6n Social (RPS).
The  implementation  of  conditional  cash  transfer  programs  has  been  accompanied  by
systematic  efforts  to  measure  their effectiveness  and  understand  their  broader  impact  on
households'  behavior,  a marked departure  from the limited attention  that has been paid to
2 rigorous  impact  evaluations  in the  past.  This  paper  reviews  the experience  in evaluating
the  impact  of CCT  programs  in the  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  region,  exploring  the
application  of experimental  and  quasi-experimental  methods  in the  cases  outlined  above.
Based  on  a  review  of the  methodologies  applied  and evaluation  results  generated  up  to
2002, we draw brief conclusions  about the welfare  impact of this type of program, explore
how these evaluations  have been used to inform policy decisions  and provide  ideas for the
future direction of evaluations of social sector programs.
The following  section presents  a brief overview  of CCT programs in Latin America. Next,
we  focus  on  a  subset  CCT  program  evaluations  that  are  at  a  more  advanced  stage  of
implementation  and  examine  the  main  issues  in  their  evaluation  design  and  application.
This  review  draws from  program documents  provided by CCT administrators,  as well  as
evaluation reports produced by contracted research institutions.  We proceed to analyze  the
' In  March  2002,  PROGRESA  changed  its  name  to  Oportunidades and  introduced  several  changes  to  its
objectives  and  operational  features,  including  an expansion  to urban  areas.  Given the  recent nature  of this
change,  and  thus, the limited experience  with the renewed  program,  this paper will concentrate  primarily on
examining the original PROGRESA  program.
2From  1998  to 2000,  an annual review of World  Bank projects  was conducted  across regions and  sectors  to
analyze  the  quality of impact evaluation  plans  incorporated  into the  project  appraisal process.  Although  the
percentage  of projects  that  include  comprehensive  evaluation  plans  doubled  over  these  years,  the  review
revealed  that only  10% of projects  had adequate  plans for a rigorous impact evaluation (World Bank 2001b).
3evaluation results and  their use to inform  policy decisions,  and before  concluding,  discuss
expected new insights from forthcoming evaluations.
IL Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Overview 3
Each of the  CCT programs  reviewed  in this paper identifies  human  capital  accumulation
among  poor  or  vulnerable  families  as  its  central  objective,  but  the  programs  vary  with
respect  to  other  objectives  such  as  reducing  current  poverty,  lessening  child  labor  and
providing  a  social  safety  net  during  crises.  CCT  programs  vary  also  according  to  the
inclusiveness  of  their  objectives,  with  some  adopting  an  integrated  approach  to  human
development  while  others  focus  on  achieving  specific  outcomes  among  identified
population groups such as working children (Table 1).
Education and Health Components
Most  programs  have  two  components:  an  education  component  and  a  health/nutrition
component.  The education  component  consists of a cash grant targeted  to primary  school-
age  children.  In countries  with higher  educational  attainment  such  as  Mexico,  Colombia
and  Jamaica,  this  component  also  seeks  to  benefit  secondary  school-age  adolescents
(Table  1).  The  receipt of education  grants (and  in  some cases cash  or in-kind  support for
school  materials)  is  conditioned  on  school  enrollment  and  regular  school  attendance
(usually 80-85%  of school days). Given its objective of reducing child labor, Brazil's PETI
also requires participation in an after-school  program.
The  methodology  applied  to calculate  the  size  of educational  grants  varies  considerably
across  countries  (see Table 2).  In Mexico  and Honduras,  the education  grant  covers  both
direct costs (school  fees,  school supplies,  transportation costs, etc.)  as  well  as opportunity
costs  derived  from  the  income  lost  as  a result  of sending  children  to school  rather  than
work.  In  lower  income  countries,  the  grant  size  generally  covers  only  part  of  the
opportunity  cost.  In  Colombia  and  Mexico  educational  grants  for secondary  school  are
higher  than  for  primary  school  to  reflect  the  increasing  opportunity  cost  of work  as
children  grow  older.  In  Mexico,  grants  at  the  secondary  level  are  higher  for  females  to
provide  an  added  incentive  for  reversing  a  pattern  of  unequal  gender  participation  in
secondary  education  and  to  internalize  education  externalities  that  accrue  as  they  raise
families of their own (Skoufias, 2001).
Health  and nutrition grants are targeted to newborn children up to the age of 2 or 3, and in
some cases,  children  up  to the time  they  enroll  in primary  school.  In Honduras,  Jamaica
and  Mexico,  pregnant  and  lactating  women  are  also  among  program  beneficiaries.  This
component  consists of a cash  transfer  aimed  at food  consumption,  as  well  as  health  care
and  nutrition  education for  mothers.  In  Nicaragua  and Mexico,  this component  explicitly
stipulates the provision  of a basic  health  care  package  for the target household  members.
Receipt  of  the  cash  transfer  is  conditional  on  compliance  by  participating  household
members  with  a pre-determined  number  of health  center  visits  and  health  and  nutrition
3For a more in-depth description  of CCT programs see Ilahi, et al. 2000, Legovini  and Regalia 2001  and
Morley and Coady  2003.
4workshops.4 Children's  health  care  visits  are  linked  to  growth  monitoring  and,  often,
vaccination protocols.  Health  care visits for pregnant  and lactating  women  seek to ensure
appropriate  prenatal, childbirth and puerperal care. In Mexico and Jamaica adult household
members other than pregnant and lactating women are  also required to get a check-up once
or twice per year (see Table 2).
As  shown  in Table  2,  the value  of the monthly  cash  grant  per family  for the  health  and
nutrition  component  varies  across  countries.  In  Honduras,  for  example,  researchers
calculated  the  value of the  nutrition  and  health voucher  as  equivalent  to the  value  of the
time invested by the mother during the trip and waiting at the health center. In Jamaica,  the
health grant per beneficiary  per month was set at the same level as  the education  transfer
(US$9)  which  is  twice  the  monthly  expenditure  per  person  in  1999  on  health  care  and
medicine.  In Colombia, the amount of the health  and nutrition grant was set equivalent to
the mean income required to allow an average indigent family to reach the extreme poverty
line whereby they were able to consume a nutritiously adequate amount of food.
Supply Side Support
In  some countries  CCT programs  go  beyond providing demand-side  monetary  incentives
to families by strengthening  the supply of these  services.  In Nicaragua,  teachers  receive  a
modest bonus per child participating  in the program,  half of which is intended  to pay for
school  materials.  In  addition,  NGOs are contracted  to provide  health  services.  In Mexico,
resources are set aside  to  cover the costs of additional  health services demanded due to the
program  and  ensure  an  adequate  supply  of  equipment,  medicines  and  material.  In
Honduras,  the CCT program provides  grants  directly to schools  and health centers  as part
of  an  experiment  designed  explicitly  to  compare  the  effectiveness  of  three  alternative
interventions combining demand and supply incentives.
Poverty Targeting
Targeting the poor or vulnerable is a critical feature of each reviewed CCT program.  Most
rely  on  both  geographic  and  household  level  targeting,  with  the  specific  targeting
mechanisms  utilized depending primarily on the type of data available (Table 3).
To carry out geographical  level  targeting,  Jamaica  collects  annual  consumption  data  that
provide poverty  incidence  figures  at the parish level. PATH  utilizes  these data to allocate
program  funds  across  parishes  and  to  construct  a  scoring  formula  to  identify  poor
households.  In Mexico eligible  communities  in rural  areas are selected using a marginality
index  based  on census  data, while  in Honduras  the Height  Census of First Grade  School
Children  provided  data  on  the  level  of  malnutrition  is  used  to  select  program
municipalities.  In  most  countries,  the  criteria  applied  to  select  which  communities  will
receive the CCT program also includes  a consideration of the supply capacity to respond to
the increased demand in health and education services.
4  In  Nicaragua,  at the outset of the program there  was a rule that  families would  lose their grant if there was
not adequate  weight gain for malnourished  children but this was dropped  after the first year of operation.
5At  the  household  level,  many  programs  are  experimenting  with  proxy-means  tests  that
estimate households'  poverty  levels  as a criteria  for program participation  (Table  3).  In
Nicaragua,  the results  of household-level  proxy means tests  are being compared  to results
from doing geographic  targeting alone.  Other countries  are taking advantage of economies
of scale in the use of proxy.means  tests.  In Colombia, household eligibility  is based on an
existing  information  system  managed  by  municipalities  (Sistema  de  Seleccion  de
Beneficiarios para  Programas Sociales,  SISBEN).  This  system  identifies  potential
beneficiaries  of social  programs  by  classifying  households  according  to  an  unmet  basic
needs index and other indicators such as average household  schooling that serve  as income
proxies.  It  has  been  used  primarily  to  identify  eligible  beneficiaries  for  the  subsidized
health  regime,  but its use  is now  being  expanded  to a  variety  of social  sector  initiatives,
including  the CCT program.  In Jamaica  the government is planning to expand the use of
the  scoring  formula  developed  for  the  PATH  to  other  safety  net  programs  to  avoid
duplication of administrative systems  and increase coordination across programs.
In  some  countries  beneficiaries'  eligibility  is  reviewed  periodically.  In  Mexico  and
Jamaica,  households'  poverty  status  is  re-evaluated  every  three  years  to  determine  their
continuation  in  the program.  In  Nicaragua,  the  RPS  is designed  to last  three  years  in  a
beneficiary community,  after which the cash transfers will be phased out, keeping only the
supply intervention for two more years without a re-assessment of eligibility.
Conditional Cash Transfer Programs' Growing Poverty Alleviation  Role
As  reflected  by  the  number  of beneficiaries  and budget  allocations,  CCT  programs  are
playing  an  increasingly  important  role  in  many  countries'  poverty  reduction  strategies.
Mexico's  PROGRESA  began  operations  in  1997  covering  300,000  households  in  more
than  5,000  communities.  In  2002,  the program reached  more than four  million families,
representing  20 percent of the Mexican  population. The program's  2002 annual budget was
around  Mex$18  billion  (US$1.8  billion).  In  Brazil,  Bolsa Escola program  was  first
implemented  in  the mid-nineties  in  Campinas  and  Brasilia.  By  the end  of 2001,  it had
evolved  into a national  program  covering 4.8 million families  in  5,469 municipalities.  In
Jamaica,  PATH  is  a key  element  of the  government's  initiative  to transform  the  social
safety net into a fiscally sound and more  efficient system of social assistance for the poor
and  vulnerable.  It  aims  to  consolidate  three  major  income  transfer  programs  into  one,
improve  targeting  measures,  improve  the  cost-effectiveness  of delivering  benefits  and
adjust  benefit  levels  to  assessed  needs.  In  Colombia,  the  CCT program  is  the  flagship
program of the three safety net programs introduced  in 2001 to provide relief in the face of
Colombia's recession.  The CCT program  is designed to run through 2004 with a budget of
US$455 million and is expected to reach over a million beneficiary children.
II.  Evaluation of CCT Programs: Design and Implementation
This  section  reviews  the  evaluation  strategies  applied  in  the  first  generation  of CCT
programs in  Brazil, Honduras,  Mexico  and Nicaragua.  Each of these programs  prioritized
6the  early  use of  robust  evaluations  as  a  key  element  for informing  program  design  and
expansion. Except for Brazil's PETI, each lused randomized control designs as the primary
evaluation  methodology  underpinning  a  fairly  large-scale  social  experiment,  carefully
planned well in advance with strong support from program staff and policymakers.
The  first  generation  of  CCT  evaluations  aimed  at  assessing  program  impact  and
operational  performance  by examining:  (1)  the adequacy of CCT programs'  administrative
processes;  (2) the extent  to which  CCT programs  reach poor  areas  and poor households;
(3)  the  existence  and  size  of  expected  impacts;  (4)  any  unanticipated  effects;  (5)
beneficiaries  and  other  stakeholders'  perceptions  about  the  program  and;  (6)  the  cost-
effectiveness  of program delivery mechanisms.
Measuring Program Impacts
The  impact  evaluations  of  early  CCT  programs  have  focused  primarily  on  measuring
changes in short and medium term indicators of human capital accumulation.  In education,
evaluations  include an assessment of changes  in school enrollment and attendance  rates. In
some  cases,  they  also  analyze  changes  in  promotion  and  repetition  rates.  PRAF  and
PROGRESA  go  beyond  outcome  indicators  and  attempt  to  measure  changes  in  impact
indicators  such  as average test scores.  In addition, given the PRAF evaluation  objective of
comparing  the impact  of supply and  demand  side  interventions,  evaluators  will examine
changes  in  the  availability  and  quality  of education  inputs  such  as  the  percentage  of
teachers trained and the percentage of schools with basic teaching materials.
In  health and nutrition,  the evaluations  included  a wide range  of utilization. and quality of
health care indicators.  Variations across programs in the target population  of the health and
nutrition component  are reflected  in the diverse  selection of child,  maternal or adult health
indicators.  Child health indicators  typically include participation  rates in child growth  and
development  monitoring, diarrhea incidence,  vaccination  coverage,  and malnutrition  rates.
Maternal  health indicators include utilization  rates  and satisfaction  with pre and post-natal
care.  Honduras'  PRAF evaluation attempts  to measure final program  impacts by analyzing
changes  in maternal and infant mortality.
Changes  in  consumption  levels  and  patterns  are  also  central  to  many  CCT evaluations.
Total consumption per capita disaggregated  by food and non-food items such as health and
education spending is frequently  used  as an indicator  in the evaluations.  In  addition, given
the  implicit  objective  of  reducing  current  poverty,  Mexico's  PROGRESA  evaluation
investigates  the impact of cash  transfers  on the poverty  headcount  ratio,  poverty  gap and
poverty severity index.
Eliminating harmful forms  of child labor is an explicit objective of Brazil's PETI program.
The  program  evaluation  assesses  this  objective  by  looking  into  indicators  such  as  child
participation  in  the  labor  force,  number  of  hours  worked  and  employment  in  risky
activities.  Although not an explicit  objective  of the program,  the PROGRESA  evaluation
7examines  the  impact  on  child  labor by  studying  changes  in  household  members'  time
allocation.
Development  programs  often have direct and indirect effects  other than those  specified  in
their  objectives.  Some of the  CCT evaluations  have  analyzed  these  and  other  additional
impacts.  For  example,  the  distribution  of cash  grants  directly  to  mothers  may have  an
effect on both intra-household  resource allocations and power relations. Likewise, program
cash  transfers  may  crowd  out  remittances  and  other  private  transfers  received  by  the
households.  Cash  transfers  may  also have  an  impact  on  household  work incentives  and
household  level  targeting  may  affect  community  relations  when  some,  but  not  all,
members of a community receive program benefits.
Evaluation Design
Measuring  program  impacts  consists  of  assessing  causality  by  determining  whether  a
program  changes the mean  value of an outcome  variable  among participants,  compared to
what they  would have  experienced  had they not participated.  Thus, the central problem in
impact evaluation  arises from  the fact  that program  participants  cannot be simultaneously
observed  in  the  alternative  state  of  no  participation,  i.e.  the  counterfactual  situation.
Evaluators  typically  simulate  the counterfactual  by  comparing  program  participants  (the
treatment group) with a control or comparison  group with similar characteristics,  especially
those relevant to program  participation.  The construction of the counterfactual  determines
the evaluation  design,  which  can be  broadly classified  into  two  categories:  experimental
and  quasi-experimental.  These  evaluation  designs  vary  in feasibility,  cost,  and the degree
of clarity and validity of results.
Experimental or randomized  control designs involve  the random assignment of individuals
(or another unit of analysis)  into those who receive the intervention  (treatment group)  and
those  from whom the intervention is withheld  (control group).  Since program participants
are  selected  randomly,  any  difference  with  the  control  group  is  due  to  chance,  not
selection.  For this  reason,  experimental  designs  are usually regarded as  the  most reliable
evaluation  method and the one  yielding the easiest-to-interpret  results (Freeman and Rossi,
1993; Grossman,  1994).  When randomization  is not feasible,  a quasi-experimental  design
can be constructed by generating a comparison  group through alternative means. Statistical
matching  is  commonly  used  to  select  non-program  participants  comparable  in  essential
characteristics  to participants, on the basis of observable characteristics.
The first generation  of CCT evaluations took advantage  of the gradual implementation  of
these programs  in  order to  randomly  incorporate  beneficiaries  as  the program expanded,
taking advantage of the opportunities provided by logistical complexities,  fiscal constraints
and  uncertainty  about  the  magnitude  of  program  impacts5. This  approach  reflected
pragmatism  and  a desire  to rigorously  explore the impact of these new programs,  leading
5 For example,  to  increase  its  coverage  of rural  areas,  Mexico's  PROGRESA  expanded  progressively  in
eleven phases from August  1997 to early 2000.  In Nicaragua,  the RPS started  with a 2-year  pilot phase in two
departments  (Madriz  and Matagalpa),  whereas  in Honduras,  funding availability  limited  the implementation
of PRAF to a subset of municipalities.
8to  the  explicit  use  of  random  assignment  as  the  program  expanded  to  generate  an
experimental design.
Most  first  generation  CCT  evaluation  designs  rely  on  random  allocation  of  program
benefits by geographic  area  (see  Table  5).  The broader  geographic  nature  of some of the
CCT program  components  such  as  improvements  in  the  supply  of health  and  education
services along with the difficulties of having both treatment  and control groups in the same
community  made  randomization  at  the  household  level  unpractical.  In  PROGRESA,
evaluators  randomly  assigned  localities  into  the  treatment  and  control  group.  Treatment
localities  entered  the  program  in  November  1997  as  part  of  phase  II,  while  control
localities  were scheduled  to enter the program in later phases. By December 2000, control
localities started receiving PROGRESA benefits.
In Honduras  and Nicaragua,  randomization  was implemented  at the municipal  and census
area  level  respectively.  In  Honduras,  the  evaluation  objectives  required  three  different
treatment  groups  to compare  the impacts  of different combinations  of demand  and supply
incentives.  Allocation by municipalities  was  the preferred option for randomization  given
their well-defined  borders  and the  feasibility  of linking  each household,  school  or health
center with a particular  municipality. Program municipalities were selected using data from
the  School  Height  Census.  A  subset  of municipalities  was  randomly  assigned  during  a
public event  to one  of four evaluation  groups:  Gl  (demand vouchers),  G2 (vouchers  plus
improvements  in service  quality), G3 (improvements  in service quality  only), G4 (control
group).  RPS  in  Nicaragua  followed  a  similar  process  randomizing  census  areas  into
treatment  and control groups.
In  contrast  to  the other  programs,  PETI  followed  a quasi-experimental  design.  Since  the
universal  implementation  of the program was deemed too costly,  it was first installed only
in  a few  municipalities  in  the  state  of Pemambuco,  and  later  expanded  to other  states
including  Bahia  and  Sergipe.  In  this  case  however,  the  evaluation  was  planned  after the
program  started  and  it  was  not  possible  to  randomly  allocate  the  municipalities  into
treatment  and  control  groups.  Instead,  the  treatment  group  was  composed  of  three
participating  municipalities  in  separate  states,  and the  comparison  group  of three  similar
municipalities not in the program.
Data Collection
Early  planning  of  most  CCT  evaluations  allowed  for  the  application  of  experimental
designs  and the collection  of baseline  data.  This has permitted  the collection  of repeated
observations from households in the treatment and control groups before and after program
implementation.  By examining changes  over time within treatment and control households,
the evaluation  accounts  for characteristics  that do not  change  over  time within treatment
and  comparison  households,  as  well  as  for characteristics  that change  over  time  and  are
common to both groups.  Random assignment  into treatment and control groups, combined
with  the  collection  of  baseline  and  follow  up  data  allows  difference-in-differences
9estimators  to be applied  to measure program impact.  Except for PETI,  all first generation
6 CCT evaluations have baseline data collected before program  implementation.
All CCT evaluations  rely  on  household  surveys  as  their main  data  collection  instrument.
Each questionnaire  contains  a core set of questions  about  the demographic  composition of
the  households;  household  expenditures  and  remittances;  and  the  socio-economic  status,
education,  health,  migration  and labor market participation  of household members.  Other
modules  such  as  anthropometrics  (height  and  weight),  fertility,  participation  in  other
programs  and  time  allocation  are  included  only  in  some  country  questionnaires.  In
Honduras,  the  household  survey  questionnaire  also  incorporates  two  modules  on  the
quality of health services and schools to evaluate the supply-side component of PRAF.7
School  and health centers  surveys and community  questionnaires  are also  frequently used
for evaluation.  In Honduras  and Mexico,  student  achievement  test scores  were  applied  to
analyze  program  impact on  academic  performance.  Beneficiaries  and  other stakeholders'
perceptions  about the program  are often captured  through qualitative studies.  As part of the
operational  evaluation  of the program,  PROGRESA conducted  semi-structured  interviews
with  secondary  school  and  health  clinic  staff,  as  well  as  focus  group  discussions  with
beneficiaries,  non-beneficiaries,  and community  mothers who  serve  as  local  contacts  for
PROGRESA.
Qualitative  studies  have  also been  used  to complement  impact  evaluations  in Nicaragua.
They included two parts:  a study on perceptions  of the program's social impact and a study
on  perceptions  of  the  poverty  targeting  mechanism.  The  former  is  aimed  at  assessing
beneficiaries'  perceptions  of the  program's  impact  on welfare.  It includes  a beneficiary
survey;  focus  groups  discussions  with  beneficiaries  and  community  mothers;  key
informant  interviews  with representatives  from the ministries  of health  and education,  the
mayor's  office,  health  care providers, NGO's, and local  program office  staff;  and 6 case-
studies  of  beneficiary  families  in  different  municipalities.  The  qualitative  targeting
assessment  includes  surveys  and  focus  group  discussions  with  beneficiaries  and  non-
beneficiaries,  as well as key informant interviews.
Implementation Issues
The  application  of  social  experiments  poses  a  number  of challenges  at  each  stage  of
implementation.  Experience  to  date  in  the  evaluation  of  CCT  programs  reveals  two
6The  RPS has completed  follow up measurements  after one  and two years  of program  implementation  and
plans to conduct a third one  once demand  incentives are eliminated and only the supply intervention  remains.
Including  the baseline,  PROGRESA  has six rounds of panel  data in  rural areas collected  every six months.
For PRAF, evaluators  planned to follow up after one and two years of program implementation (see Table 5).
7 Although  it  is not  strictly part of the evaluation,  a census  was conducted  in the evaluation  areas  in some
countries.  In  Mexico,  it collected  data  to  determine  household  eligibility.  In  Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  it
generated  a  beneficiary  registry  and  a  household  listing  to draw  a representative  sample  of households  in
treatment and control  areas,  and provided  information  to simulate the inclusion  and exclusion errors resulting
from a proxy-means test targeting mechanism.
10particular  issues:  the  difficulty  of coordinating  the  impact  evaluations  with  the  programn
implementation  schedule,  and the  challenge  of fostering  the political  support  required  to
achieve  a successful  impact  evaluation.  Delays  in program  implementation  occur  often
when  implementing  new  programs  that  are  logistically  complex  such  as  CCT programs.
Likewise,  changes in the political  arena such  as forthcoming  political elections  or changes
in  program  administration  may  affect  the  implementation  schedule,  and  sometimes  the
integrity of program design itself.  Moreover,  unexpected  events such  as recent flooding in
Jamaica can  also  alter the  program  implementation  schedule.  Such  events  can  effect  the
evaluation  in  a number of ways.  For example,  in  Nicaragua,  baseline  data was  collected
during  August/September  2000  and  follow  up  data collection  was  scheduled  during  the
same  months  a  year  later.  However,  coordinating  the health  care  providers  took  longer
than expected  and the health component  did not start until June 2001. Thus,  evaluators had
to postpone follow-up data collection until October.  Although having a control group helps
in this  kind of situation,  the use  of panel  surveys  conducted  at different  times  during  the
year may cause problems due to the confounding nature of seasonal  effects.
Problems  can  also  occur  due  to  delays  in  developing  the  program  Management
Information  System (MIS).  This  delay may  cause  deficiencies  in the delivery  of program
benefits  to  go  undetected,  and  thus,  unaccounted  for  in  the  evaluation.  In  Mexico,
PROGRESA  payment  records  revealed  that 27%  of the  total  eligible  population  in  the
evaluation  sample  had  not  received  any  benefits  after  almost  two  years  of  program
operation.  This can cause a divergence between  the "intention to treat" effect estimated by
the  evaluation  and  the  mean  effect  of  the  program  on  those  who  actually  received  the
benefits of the program.8
Finally,  as  revealed  by the  experience  of PROGRESA  and  PRAF,  implementing  impact
evaluations  requires  strong  political  support,  particularly  when  a  randomized  control
design  is  proposed. The  incorporation  of a control  or comparison  group  in the evaluation
can  generate  strong  criticism,  with  attendant  political  and  media  pressure  to  extend
program  benefits  to non-participants.  Thus,  one of the lessons from  the first generation  of
CCT evaluations  is the need to secure a solid commitment from policymakers  to maintain
the  integrity  of the  program  and  evaluation  designs.  It  is  also  important  to effectively
communicate  the benefits of random  allocation  when  budget constraints prevent  reaching
all eligible beneficiaries at once.
IV.  Evaluation  Results and Impact on the Ground
Evaluation  results are  available  for PROGRESA  in Mexico,  PETI in Brazil  and  the RPS
pilot  in  Nicaragua.  These  evaluations  reveal  that conditional  cash  transfers  can  provide
effective  incentives  for  investing  in  the  poor's  human  capital.  In  education  ,  CCT
8As discussed  in Skoufias  2001, the  use of the PROGRESA  eligibility  variable for program  evaluation allows
the evaluators  to estimate  the "intention to treat"  effect. To the extent that  not all eligible  households  actually
receive  program  benefits,  the  "intention  to  treat"  effect  underestimates  the  program  mean  effect on  actual
program beneficiaries.
For a comprehensive  discussion of education impacts  see Schultz, 2000a-c; Behrman, Sengupta and Todd,
2000;  and IFPRI, 2002a.programs  have  demonstrated  a positive effect on enrollment  rates for both boys and girls.
In Mexico,  primary  school  enrollment rates before  PROGRESA were between  90 and 94
percent.  Estimates  of  program  impact  controlling  for  household  and  community
characteristics  range  between  0.74  and  1.07  percentage  points  for boys  and  0.96  to  1.45
percentage points  for girls (see Table 6). At the secondary  level,  baseline enrollment rates
were  67 and  73 percent  for girls  and boys respectively.  Estimates of program  impact for
girls range  from 7.2 to 9.3  percentage  points and  from  3.5  to  5.8 for boys.  In  Nicaragua,
program  impacts  are  even  more  impressive  (see  Table  7).  Average  enrollment  rates  in
treatment areas increased  nearly 22 percentage points as a result of the prograrn from a low
starting point of 68.5 percent. Program impact on attendance  rates are mixed. In Nicaragua,
the evaluation  indicates  a higher impact on attendance  than  on enrollment  rates; the RPS
produced an  increase  of  30 percentage  points in  the percentage  of children  who  had less
than  6 unexcused  school  absences in a two-month  period. By contrast,  the evaluation  of
PROGRESA showed more pronounced effects on enrollment that on attendance rates.
Conditional  cash  transfers  are  also effective  in reducing child labor.  In Mexico,  the CCT
program reduced  the probability  of working among  aged 8 to  17 by  10 to  14%  relative  to
the level observed  prior to the program. The impact is higher for boys aged  12 to 13  years
old:  a  15 to 20% reduction  in the probability of working relative  to the level prior to the
program,  but no  significant  reduction  was  found for boys  aged  16  to  17.  For girls,  there
was  also  a significant  reduction in  the probability  of working  despite their  overall  lower
participation  in  the  labor  market  (Parker  and  Skoufias,  2000).  In  Brazil,  the  evaluation
shows that as a result of participating  in the PETI program, the probability of working fell
between  4-7 percentage points in Pemambuco, close to 13 percentage points in Sergipe and
nearly  26 percentage  points in Bahia which has  the highest child labor force  participation
rate  in Brazil  - 38  percent  of children  aged 7  to  14  (Yap,  Sedlacek  and  Orazem  2001).
Moreover,  PETI  also  decreased  the  probability  of  children  working  in  higher  risk
activities.  Nonetheless  the program is  less successful  in limiting the probability of working
10 hours  or more.  Another interesting  result is that even though  the after-school  program
was available  to  all  households  in  PETI  municipalities,  only children  in households  that
received  the  cash  transfer  spent  significantly  more  time  in  school.  This  suggests  that
demand incentives may have an important role in accelerating behavioral changes.
Child  health  and  nutrition  has  also  improved  as  a  result  of  CCT  programs.  The
PROGRESA  evaluation  shows  a  significant  increase  in  nutrition  monitoring  and
immunization  rates.  Infants under  three  years old participating  in  PROGRESA  increased
their growth monitoring visits between  30 to 60 percent,  and beneficiaries  aged 0 to 5 had
a  12  percent  lower  incidence  of illness  compared  to non-PROGRESA  children  (Gertler,
2000).  In  addition,  the  data  suggest  that  PROGRESA  has  had  a  significant  impact  on
increasing child growth  and lowered the probability  of child stunting for children aged  12
to  36  months  old  (Behrman  and  Hoddinott,  2000).  In  Nicaragua,  even  greater
improvements  were generated by the CCT program.  Approximately  60 percent of children
less than 3 years old participated in nutrition monitoring before the RPS  was implemented.
After a few months of program operation,  more than  90 percent  of children  in RPS  areas
benefited from nutrition monitoring  compared to only 67 percent in control  areas. In terms
12of  immunization  rates,  the  RPS  increased  timely  immunization  among  children  12-23
months old by  18 percentage  points (IFPRI 2002a).
Consumption  levels  have  also improved  as  a result of participating  in CCT programs.  In
Mexico,  the  average  consumption  level  of  PROGRESA  households  increased  by  14
percent,  and median food expenditures  after just over a year of program operation  were 11
percent  higher  compared  to  non-PROGRESA  households.  The  increase  in  household
consumption  is  in  large  part  driven  by  higher  expenditures  on  fruits,  vegetables,  and
animal  products.  Median  caloric  acquisition  in PROGRESA  households  increased  by 7.8
percent  (Hoddinott,  et.  al.  2000).  In  Nicaragua,  control  households  experienced  a  sharp
decline in consumption  due in part to low coffee prices and a drought, whereas  the average
per capita annual household expenditures  in RPS areas did not change (IEFPRI  2002a).  The
net program  impact  translates  into a  19  percent  increase  in per  capita  consumption  and
suggests that CCT programs may help poor people protect consumption  in times of crisis,  a
risk management role worthy of further analysis.
In Mexico,  the evaluation  revealed that CCT  investments  are  delivered in  a cost-effective
manner.  As discussed  in Coady 2000,  the administrative  costs of delivering  cash transfers
to poor households  appear to be small relative  to the costs of previous Mexican  programs
as  well  as  to  targeted  programs  in other  countries.  For every  100 pesos  allocated  to  the
program  8.9  pesos  are  absorbed  by administrative  costs.  The largest  components  are  the
costs associated  with targeting  at the household  level (nearly  30 percent), followed by the
costs associated with conditioning the receipt of transfers  (26 percent).
Political Economy
All  three programs  started with partial country coverage and  have since expanded  to other
areas.  The  impact  evaluations  applied  in  Mexico  and  Nicaragua's  CCT  programs  have
triggered  some  program  modifications,  guided  program  expansion  decisions,  allowed  the
programs  to  survive  changes  in  political  administrations  and  generated  interest  in
replicating  these  programs  internationally.  In  Mexico,  whereas  PROGRESA  was  first
limited  to rural  areas,  the  program's  positive  impacts  helped  prompt  its  expansion  into
urban areas.  Moreover,  the program has continued  with relatively  few  alterations despite a
change in government.  Likewise, the continuation and expansion of the RPS  in the face of
change in government  in Nicaragua  was related to the program's  achievement  of a set of
targets  measured  by the  impact evaluation.  The  RPS  evaluation  showed  that  the program
had  met  most  of its  targets  and  in  many  cases  performed  far  better  than  anticipated,  a
finding that triggered new negotiations for program expansion.
Few development initiatives have been evaluated  as rigorously  as CCT programs.  This has
opened  a debate  on whether other programs with  similar objectives  would have performed
better  or  worse  had  they  too  been  evaluated.  It  has  also  fueled  a  debate  about  the
concurrent  need for promoting  income generating  activities  among  poor households.  This
may  be  seen  as  a  natural  complement  and  necessary  condition  for  the  sustainability  of
human capital investment of future  generations.  However,  it is far from obvious that CCT
programs  themselves  should take  on this additional  objective.  It may well  be that  a better
solution  is  to  focus  on  the  creation  or  strengthening  of  separate  income  generation
13programs,  while  ensuring  adequate  coordination  with  CCT and  other  poverty  reduction
programs.  So far,  the tendency  in  Mexico  as  well  as  Nicaragua  has been  to  expand the
mandate  of CCT  programs  to  include  training  and  other  activities  to  promote  income
generation.  Fortunately,  both programs  are planning  to conduct  an  impact evaluation  that
will help inform the current debate.
V. Forthcoming  Evaluations:  Expected New Insights
A new  round of CCT programs  has recently  started  operating  in Colombia,  Jamaica  and
urban  areas  of  Mexico.  This  second  generation  of CCT  programs  is being  implemented
under  considerably  different  circumstances  than  the  earlier  programs.  First,  they  have
benefited  from  the  operational  experience  accumulated  by  the  first  generation.  Thus,
although logistical aspects are always  demanding, they are less daunting.  Second, evidence
of  program  impacts  from  the  first  generation  has  reduced  the  uncertainty  of program
results,  and  thus  the need  for small-scale  prior  experimentation  and  a  strictly  phased-in
implementation  approach.  Finally,  the  socio-economic  and  political  context  in  some  of
these  countries  is particularly  pressing.  As a result,  their implementation  plans  include  a
nation-wide  expansion  in a relatively short time.  FA in Colombia  and PATH in Jamaica,
for example,  have had short pilots (6 months long) mostly to test the proper functioning of
program processes,  which have been rapidly followed by nationwide expansion.
Consequently,  evaluation  activities  vary  with  respect  to  the  first  generation  and  new
methodologies  are being tested. Program pilots include only a process evaluation,  whereas
an impact evaluation  is planned for the full-scale program.  Randomized evaluation designs
are more challenging  when evaluating nation-wide  program.  Hence,  the second generation
of CCT programs  relies  on quasi-experimental  evaluation  designs,  specifically  matching
methods.
In  Jamaica,  two  alternatives  are  being considered  for selecting  a comparison  group.  The
first  one relies  on  a technique called propensity  score  matching.  This technique  involves
predicting  the probability of program participation  for non-program  participants  based  on
their  socio-economic  characteristics  and  constructing  a  comparison  group  among  those
with  a  participation  probability  closest  to  program  beneficiaries.  The  second  alternative
takes  advantage  of  the proxy  means  test  used  for beneficiary  selection  and  constructs  a
comparison  group  using  those  households  who  applied  to  the  program  but  were  not
selected because  they  fell above  the  cut-off point  in the scoring  formula.  Presumably,  on
average,  households  immediately  above  the  cut-off  point  are  very  similar  to  program
beneficiaries  and can serve as a comparison  group.
A similar approach will be used in the Oportunidades  evaluation  in urban  areas of Mexico
and will be complemented  by a second comparison  group drawn from eligible households
in non-intervention  areas, selected through propensity score matching techniques.
In  Colombia, municipalities  who applied  to  the program  are classified  as  "green"  if they
meet all the selection  criteria (see Table  3)  or "yellow"  if they fail  to satisfy one or more
14criterion.  Evaluators plan to construct a comparison group from yellow municipalities  who
failed to meet  criteria  believed  not to be relevant  to program outcomes  such  as failure  to
delivery  all required paperwork  or having a bank in town.
By  relying  on  quasi-experimental  designs,  second  generation  evaluations  are  politically
less sensitive and also less demanding in terms of implementation.  However, the results are
likely  to  be  less  robust  and  transparent  than  those  generated  by  carefully  planned
experimental  designs.  In  addition,  given  the  rapid  expansion  to national  scale  of these
programs,  there  is  less  control  over  the  timing  of  the  implementation  schedule  and  a
greater need for flexibility  in the evaluation plans.  In Colombia, for example,  some of the
municipalities  in  the treatment  group received  the first payment  before baseline  data were
collected.  This prompted changes  in the sampling frame of the evaluation, the inclusion of
retrospective  questions  in  the survey questionnaire  and  the  use of additional  econometric
techniques  to  control  for  possible  non-random  selection  of  early  participating
municipalities.  Fears of potential contamination  of the comparison  group are present in the
second  generation  of CCT programs.  In  Jamaica,  the option  of using the households just
above  the cutoff point established by the proxy means  test for constructing  a comparison
group faces  the risk of contamination from premature  incorporation of households  into the
program  due  to  changes  in  the  cut-off  point  established  in  the  scoring  formula  for  the
proxy means test.
These evaluations  address  many of the same core questions regarding program impacts  on
school attendance,  health care utilization and consumption that will help confirm the cross-
program robustness  of earlier results.  They  will also  analyze  new questions  prompted  by
particular program objectives  in each country,  and to some extent, by a conscious effort to
increase  the  global  body  of knowledge  of  CCT programs.  In  Jamaica,  for instance,  the
evaluation  plans to assess program impacts  on school  age adolescents,  specifically  teenage
pregnancy  and involvement  in  violent acts.  In  Honduras,  the  evaluation  will  focus on the
relative  importance  of supply  and demand  factors  in  increasing  human  capital  as well  as
program impacts  on maternal  and child mortality  rates.  In Colombia,  the implementation
of the CCT program as one of three emergency  safety net programs  will allow for a cross-
program  comparison of the relative effectiveness  of CCT, workfare  and training programs
in  achieving  particular  outcomes.  Finally,  in  Mexico,  the  evaluation  will  exanune  the
results  of  a  new  educational  savings  program  that  sets  up  a  savings  account  for
Oportunidades  students that can be accessed upon graduation.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations  for the Future
In  contrast  to  many  development  programs,  the  recent  expansion  of conditional  cash
transfer  programs  throughout  the Latin  America  and  Caribbean  region  is  based  on fairly
solid  evidence  of program  impact.  Evaluation  results  from  the  first  generation  of  CCT
programs  in  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Nicaragua  show  that  they  are  an  effective  means  for
promoting human capital accumulation  among poor households. In particular, there is clear
evidence  of program  success  in increasing  enrollment  rates,  improving preventive  health
care  and  raising  household  consumption.  These  evaluation  results  have  provided
policymakers  with  empirical  evidence  on  efficiency  and  effectiveness,  allowing  for
15programs  to be  scaled up geographically  and  expanded  to new population  groups and  for
policy design adjustments to be implemented.
The  next  generation  of  evaluations  is  underway.  These  evaluations  will  build  on  the
existing  body  of  knowledge  of  CCT  programs  by  providing  evidence  regarding  the
medium-term  impact of existing programs,  the value of new elements being introduced  as
part of existing programs,  and the impact of new CCT programs in Jamaica, Colombia  and
urban areas of Mexico.  These evaluations will confirm or challenge  existing evidence,  shed
light  on  questions  of sustainability  and  medium-term  impacts,  and provide  policymakers
with a better understanding  of program impacts  given alternative combinations of program
inputs and different  regional circumstances.  These results  will be useful to understanding
the capacity of CCT programs  to fulfill the new demands  imposed on them,  and ensure that
these  do  not  interfere  with  the  achievement  of  the  program's  original  and  primary
objectives.
Even when evaluations  of the new  generation  of CCT  programs  become  available,  some
fundamental questions  will  remain unanswered  about the effectiveness  of CCT programs,
including  those concerning  the long-term  sustainability  of behavioral  changes,  long-term
welfare impacts,  synergies between different program components,  and trade-offs between
transfer size and number of beneficiaries.  There  is also a need to assess the effectiveness  of
CCT  programs  as  both  a  permanent  institution  for  addressing  chronic  poverty  and  a
temporary instrument for addressing vulnerability.
There  is  also  a  growing  need  for  continued  improvements  in  the  development  and
application  of evaluation  instruments.  Ex-ante  evaluations  simulating  program  impacts
through  econometric  modeling  are  being  applied  to  conditional  cash  transfer  programs,
providing  opportunities  to explore  the anticipated  impacts of program design  alternatives
such  as  transfer  sizes  and  eligibility  criteria.  Although  not  a  substitute  for  impact
evaluations,  these tools can  be very useful, particularly  at the program design stage.  There
is also a need to improve results-based monitoring and evaluation  systems  as a foundation
for effective  program  management,  and  a  need for cross-program  evaluations  to  explore
the development effectiveness  of alternative programs and policies.
The  benefits  of individual  program  evaluations  go  far beyond  country  boundaries  and
constitute a global public  good. The experience of CCT programs  in Latin  America shows
the critical  role of evaluations  in shedding  light on success  and failure  in the fight against
poverty;  the  evaluations  also  contributed  to  the  demonstration  effect  of CCT programs
which  have  been  reproduced  in several  countries  in Latin  America,  as  well  as  in Turkey.
Conversely,  caution  should  be applied in assuming that positive  evaluation  results from a
handful  of  countries  can  be  replicated  in  other  areas,  especially  areas  facing  supply
constraints  in  health  and  education  or where  the  capacity  to administer  a CCT  program
would be limited.  Nor do the positive results from one  program imply that the evaluated
program  is  necessarily  the  best  approach  to  achieving  a  particular  outcome.  Ideally,
program  evaluations  would  compare  alternative  interventions  for  achieving  a  similar
objective to determine the most effective and efficient approach.
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